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I. Introduction
When the U.S. Congress failed to enact a federal shield law in 2008,'
media organizations and other shield law supporters immediately
announced they would renew their efforts to persuade Congress to protect
journalists. The executive director of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press said, "We will reconfigure, reassemble our coalition
and try to get [shield law legislation] reintroduced as soon as possible."2
PhD and Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill
1. On October 16, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Free Flow of
Information Act, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007), by a vote of 398 to 21. Two days later similar
legislation, the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007), was placed on the
Senate calendar. However, the Senate never voted on the bill. On July 30, 2008, shield law
supporters in the Senate tried, but failed, to force a vote on the measure. See Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Senate Fails to End Debate, Move Shield Bill to a Vote
(July 30, 2008), available at http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6890.
2. Lindsay Kalter, Media Groups Will Renew Their Push for a Federal Shield Law When
the New Congress Convenes, AM. J. REv., Oct./Nov. 2008, available at
http://www.ajr.org/article-printable.asp?id=4633.
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi promised, "As soon as we have a new
Congress and a new president, we will have a new shield law.",
3
Despite the determination of shield law supporters, the issues that
thwarted adoption of a shield law by the 110th Congress could again derail
efforts to legislate a testimonial privilege for reporters, and thus those
issues deserve close scrutiny. The issues are extremely contentious and
likely to be at the center of future shield law debates because they are about
how power should be distributed among the branches of the federal
government and the media. This article identifies and analyzes the power-
distribution issues at the center of the 2005-2008 Congressional shield law
deliberations. Some of those issues were: Would a federal shield law
hamper the U.S. Department of Justice's power to combat terrorism and
other crimes? Would the law protect the media from the chilling effects of
federal subpoenas? Or would the law unwisely grant the already powerful
media legal rights denied to other citizens? And who should have the
power to decide whether to allow the media to refuse to comply with
federal subpoenas?
The conceptual framework for this research is the idea that law
distributes power among groups in society, creating the nation's social
architecture. 4  Social architecture is an extremely useful metaphor. As
developed by privacy scholar Daniel J. Solove in his book The Digital
Person,5 the notion of social architecture rests on the principles that "legal
and social structures are products of design, 6 and that law can define the
power relationships in society.7  Solove explained that just as the
architecture of a building can be designed to determine how people
interact,8 social architecture can be designed by law to determine how
3. This quote was reported by two bloggers who covered an American Magazine
Conference in New York City. See Posting of Michael Calderone to Politico.com, Pelosi: "We
Will Have a New Shield Law," http://www.politico.com/blogs/michaelcalderone/1008/
Pelosi We will have a new shieldlaw.html (Oct. 6, 2008, 10:35 EST); Post of Jeff Bercovici
to Cond6 Nast Portfolio.com, Pelosi Promises Shield Law for Journalists,
http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/mixed-media/2008/10/05/pelosi-promises-shield-law-for-
journalists (Oct. 6, 2008, 20:06 EDT).
4. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone
Noveck, eds., New York University Press) (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002) [hereinafter Solove,
Digital Dossiers]; Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability,
54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Identity Theft].
5. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004).
6. Solove, Identity Theft, supra note 4, at 1239.
7. Id. at 1241.
8. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 4, at 1114 (citing Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture
as Crime Control, I ll YALE L.J. 1039 (2002)).
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groups in society interact.9 He said this architectural metaphor "captures
how legal regulations--or the lack thereof-structure social interaction as
well as the degree of social control and freedom in a society."'
Solove said lawmakers can construct social architecture to address two
fundamental problems of government."' The first problem is "how to
control the population without stifling liberty, in other words, how to
balance order and freedom." 12 The second problem is "how to control the
government so that it remains accountable to the people. This includes
preventing officials from abusing their power, and guarding against
excessive growth in government power that threatens to override the power
of the people."'
13
Senate and House hearings and a House debate 14 have provided
platforms for the major shield law proponents and opponents 15 to discuss-
in terms both explicit and implicit-how power should be distributed. For
example, during the shield law deliberations in Congress, some of the most
explicit concerns about the distribution of power were voiced by New York
Times political columnist William Safire. 16 In 2005 Safire described for the
Senate Judiciary Committee the power of the media and the effect of
government subpoenas on the media: "We have the power of trust. We
9. Solove, Identity Theft, supra note 4, at 1239, 1241.
10. Id. at 1239 (applying a social architecture analysis to information privacy law issues).
For other examples of the application of social architecture analysis to communication law issues,
see Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis of the
Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media Employees, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073 (2007); Cathy Packer, Don't Even Ask! A Two-Level Analysis
of Government Lawsuits Against Citizen and Media Access Requestors, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 29
(2008).
11. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 4, at 1087.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The Senate Judiciary Committee held two hearings on the federal shield law in 2005
and one hearing in 2006. In 2007 the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the proposed
law, and then the House debated the bill for one hour before approving the legislation.
15. The terms "proponents" and "opponents" are applied somewhat tentatively here. A
person might support one proposed bill but not another, and statements made by a member of
Congress at a hearing might not correlate with that person's final vote-if there was a vote.
Hearing and debate testimony is not always a reliable indicator of what people really think or how
they will vote. It is, however, the most reliable indication available.
16. See Reporter's Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing on S. 1419 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (unpublished hearing, no C.I.S. number
assigned) [hereinafter Senate Hearing 2005-A] (statement of William Safire, Columnist, N.Y.
TIMES), available at http:/ftp.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/reporters.pdf, see also, Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007: Hearing on HR. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 14 (2007), [hereinafter House Hearing 20071 (statement of Rep. Pence) (explaining that he
supported the First Amendment and the shield law because "[a]s a conservative, I believe the




have the ability to say to a source, you can trust us, we won't reveal who
you are, you won't be involved, what's the truth? Now, that's our power,
that's our weapon, and it's being seized and taken away from us."'7
While the social architecture metaphor is new in the law, the idea that
law distributes power among groups in society is not new at all. More than
200 years ago, for example, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution created
three separate branches of government in order to avoid a dangerous
concentration of government power.' 8 Then the Framers added the First
Amendment to enable citizens to curb the power of the new government by
speaking and publishing.' 9 Those decisions by the Framers were decisions
about who would have the power to govern in the new United States.
Examining the federal shield law issue through the lens of social
architecture broadens our inquiry beyond the language of a particular bill or
the bill's politics; the social architecture perspective requires us to focus on
what are arguably more important considerations in lawmaking. 20 For
example, if we were analyzing the language of a shield law bill, our focus
logically might be on specific questions such as whether a blogger2' or a
17. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 25 (statement of William Safire, Columnist,
New York Times), available at http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/reporters.pdf
18. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
20. For other scholarship that discusses the arguments for and against a federal shield law,
see, e.g., Paul Brewer, The Fourth Estate and the Quest for a Double Edged Shield: Why a
Federal Reporters' Shield Law Would Violate the First Amendment, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 1073
(2006); Louis J. Capocasale, Using the Shield as a Sword: An Analysis of How the Current
Congressional Proposals for a Reporter's Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339 (2006); Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law
Proposals: What Congress Can Learn From the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 35 (2006)
[hereinafter Fargo, Analyzing]; Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy
Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist's Privilege, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1063 (2006) [hereinafter Fargo, The Year].
21. Interestingly, the issue of whether bloggers would be covered by a shield law was given
only passing mention in the 2005 and 2006 hearings. See, e.g., Reporter's Privilege Legislation:
An Additional Investigation of Issues and Implications: Hearing on S. 1419 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (unpublished hearing, no C.I.S. number assigned)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing 2005-B] (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chair, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary) (noting that the committee faced challenges in defining terms because bloggers were
"participating fully in the 24-hour news cycle."), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov
/hearings/hearing.cfinid=1637. The issue was not debated at length until the 2007 House
Judiciary Committee hearing. See, e.g., House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 60 (statement of
Randall D. Eliason, Law Professor) (observing that the testimonial privilege "would appear to
apply equally to an individual pajama-clad blogger and a reporter for the New York Times" and
arguing that "the scope of such a privilege in the Internet age is breathtaking."); House Hearing
2007, supra note 16, at 9-10 (statement of Rep. Smith, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary)
(questioning whether bloggers are journalists and confessing that he once worked as a newspaper
reporter).
journalist working for a terrorist organization22 could qualify as a "covered
person" 23 entitled to protection under the law. When we analyze the
deliberations in terms of social architecture, however, we find the issues are
broader and fundamental. Thus, in the context of the proposed federal
shield law, this social architecture analysis focuses on the proper
distribution of power among the U.S. Department of Justice, Congress, and
the media, and what a proposed federal shield law might contribute to-or
subtract from-that optimal distribution of power. My social architecture
analysis also focuses on the context within which a federal shield law
would operate. Differing views as to the context in which power is being
distributed appear to explain much of the disagreement over the shield law.
The next section of this article explores what the Constitution and the
First Amendment suggest is the appropriate distribution of power among
the three branches of the federal government, the press, and citizens. Then
this article demonstrates that the social architecture drawn by the Framers
is today inadequate for anyone to say with certainty whether the First
Amendment properly affords journalists a testimonial privilege. The U.S.
Supreme Court, the Congress, and the lower federal courts have not
resolved the issue either. The third section of this article summarizes the
most important shield law bills that came before the 109th and 1 10th
Congresses. The fourth section describes in detail the social architecture
arguments in the shield law hearings and debate in Congress. Finally, this
article summarizes these arguments and suggests how they should be
addressed by Congress with passage of a federal shield law. The final
section also suggests useful changes in the social architecture metaphor.
II. The Nation's Original Social Architecture and the
Reporter's Privilege
Most of what is known about the Framers' thinking as they drew the
first, broad outlines of the nation's social architecture comes from The
22. See, e.g., Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S.
Att'y) (objecting that the 2005 version of the shield law legislation would protect foreign media
and foreign news agencies, "some of which are hostile to the United States and some of which
can, and have, acted in support of foreign terrorist organizations .... ").
23. The Free Flow of Information Act, S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005), for example, defined
the "covered person" as "(A) an entity that disseminates information by print, broadcast, cable,
satellite, mechanical, photographic, electronic, or other means and that-(i) publishes a
newspaper, book, magazine, or other periodical; (ii) operates a radio or television broadcast
station (or network of such stations), cable system, or satellite carrier, or a channel or
programming service for any such station, network, system, or carrier; or (iii) operates a news
agency or wire service; (B) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such an entity; or (C) an employee,
contractor, or other person who gathers, edits, photographs, records, prepares, or disseminates
news or information for such an entity."
2009] THE POLITICS OF POWER
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. [31:324
Federalist Papers. A series of articles published in 1787 and 1788 that
advocate the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, The Federalist Papers
discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the new federal government.
James Madison wrote at length in The Federalist about the distribution of
power among the branches of the federal government,25 a subject that is
both the foundation of our social architecture and the root of the debate
over the federal shield law. Madison warned: "The accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands... may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny., 26 He wrote, "It is of
great importance in a republic . . . to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers ... ,27 Madison did not, however, define the
concept of separation of powers or clarify what he meant by "executive,"
"legislative," or "judicial" powers.2 8  Law Professor Keith Werhan
attributed those lapses to Madison's belief that nobody could clearly define
the powers of the branches 29 and that the Framers did not design a
government in which the branches were completely separate. 30 It is clear,
however, that Madison envisioned a complicated government in which
powers were divided in ways that ultimately preserved the power of
citizens by ensuring that no one branch would be sufficiently powerful to
oppress them.31
The Framers were heavily influenced by the writings of John Locke, a
seventeenth century Enlightenment philosopher.32 In his book Second
Treatise of Government, Locke proposed a government based on the
24. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST (J.R. Pole
ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 2005) (1788). The Federalist often is referred to as The Federalist
Papers.
25. THE FEDERALIST NoS. 47-51 (James Madison).
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 261 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publishing
Co., 2005) (1788).
27. Id.
28. Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681, 2684
(1996).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2684-85. One example of the lack of separation between the branches is that the
branches share the task of interpreting the Constitution. See, e.g.,, Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707 (1985); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001).
31. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 734-35
(2006).
32. See DAVID A. COPELAND, THE IDEA OF A FREE PRESS: THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND ITS
UNRULY LEGACY 91 (David Abrahamson ed., Northwestern University Press) (2006) (noting that
some say Jefferson "copied wholesale from Locke").
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consent of the governed.33 Locke said citizens would enter into a social
contract to create a government that would allow them to live safe,
enjoyable lives and to protect their property.34 The basic terms of the
contract were that the government would act with the consent of the
majority, and, if the government failed to act with the consent of the
majority, citizens were not obligated to obey.35 In other words, Locke
proposed a social architecture in which power ultimately belonged to
citizens, not those who governed them. Although Locke did not explicitly
say so, historians expect that Locke would have believed that the
government should be judged by citizens through the free exchange of
ideas,36 including the exchange of ideas in the free press. 37 Locke would
have believed citizens needed as much knowledge about government as
possible.38
Little is known about how much power the Framers thought should be
afforded to the press. 39 Because the language of the First Amendment's
press clause is so sparse40 and The Federalist says little on the topic,
41
discerning the meaning of the First Amendment usually has involved
studying the writings of philosophers such as John Milton42 and eighteenth-
33. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47-48 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., 1980) (1690).
34. Id. at 47-48, 111.
35. Id. at 108.
36. Copeland, supra note 32, at 92 (observing that Locke's ideas about citizens judging the
actions of the government were similar to those of the Levellers and of John Milton, and they all
advocated an open marketplace of ideas).
37. Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 92.
39. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 268 (Oxford University
Press) (1985) (observing that "[n]o one can say for certain what the Framers had in mind, because
enough evidence does not exist to justify cocksure conclusions .... "); RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 38 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) (1992) (observing that "[o]ne can keep
going round and round on the original meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent
vision of what the framers meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge.").
40. The First Amendment press clause says, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom ... of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. Despite the fact that the First Amendment
is written in absolute language, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment as
providing absolute rights. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 924-25 (Aspen Publishers 3rd ed. 2006) (2001).
41. There also is evidence of uncertainty on the part of the Framers, as evidenced by these
questions raised by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist: "What signifies a declaration, that 'the
liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved'? What is the liberty of the press? Who can give
it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be
impracticable ... " THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., 2005) (1788).
42. Locke, supra note 33, at 47-48.
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century journalists such as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. 43 In the
1644 essay Areopagitica, the English philosopher and poet John Milton
laid the foundation for many later theories of the free press an by arguing
that truth would defeat falsity if the two were allowed to compete freely. a
Milton penned this famous quote:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play on
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing
and prohibiting misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and
open encounter?
46
Around 1720, Trenchard and Gordon began publishing the famous
"Cato" essays. 47  The writers "thoroughly incorporated Locke's
[idea] of... consent of the governed ... with Milton's marketplace
concept to produce a series of essays explaining that a free and open press
was a natural right of all who lived in a state where government created
laws to meet the will of the majority," according to free-expression
historian David A. Copeland.48 Trenchard and Gordon argued that freedom
of expression was "the Right of every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt
and controul the Right of Another; and this is the only check which it ought
to suffer, the only Bounds which it ought to know. 49 They further argued
that the people had a right to scrutinize the behavior of public officials.
[I]t is the Part and Business of the People, for whose sake alone
all publick Matters are or ought to be transacted, to see whether
43. Id. at 48.
44. See generally, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (Harper & Brothers Publishers) (1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521-649 (1977).
45. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON
(Liberty Fund 1999).
46. Id.
47. Cato, the name of a Roman statesman known for his honesty, was the joint pseudonym
of the two authors. Trenchard and Gordon published the essays in London newspapers from 1720
to 1723. The essays then were republished in newspapers in the American colonies. Historian
Leonard W. Levy said Cato's Letters were quoted in every colonial newspaper from Boston to
Savannah. One especially popular essay was "Reflections upon Libelling," which was about libel
law and freedom of the press. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON xxiii (Leonard W. Levy ed., Carolina Academic Press 1966) (citations omitted)
(reprinting the Cato essays that focus on freedom of the press).
48. Copeland, supra note 32, at 97.
49. Levy, supra note 47, at xxiv (quoting Cato's Letters: Or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and
Religious, No. 15, as reprinted in the NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL, Feb. 18, 1734).
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they be well or ill transacted; so it is the Interest, and ought to
be the Ambition of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds
openly examined and publickly scanned.50
The idea that the free press is a tool to be used by citizens to learn
about and respond to their government was well developed by the time of
the American Revolution. "Americans from the 1720s on used the printed
word for a multitude of purposes, and one of them was to engage in
debate," Copeland wrote. 51 By the mid-1770s, Copeland observed, the
press was viewed as a tool of freedom:
[W]hen [John] Adams reflected on all that had happened in
the turbulent decades of the 1760s and 1770s, he said that the
fighting of 1775 on was not the revolution. The revolution
was found in the hearts and minds of the people. Anyone
who wanted to find out what they thought, he suggested, need
only consult the pamphlets and newspapers, "by which the
public opinion was enlightened and informed." The press...
was the means to an end. In order to obtain freedom, people
needed a press that would allow them to discuss and debate
matters of importance. Adams... would have said that
nothing was more important than freedom from tyranny, and
the chief catalyst in obtaining it was the press.
52
Clearly the First Amendment was designed to limit government power
over citizens and the media. However, neither the First Amendment itself
nor the historical record concerning its adoption-or the adoption of the
Constitution-delineates a social architecture that is sufficiently well
developed to answer all the modem questions about media rights and
government power.53 Therefore, the courts and Congress often have had to
fill in the lines between the broad strokes set down by the Framers.
50. Id.
51. Copeland, supra note 32, at 184.
52. Id. at 185-86.
53. But see Scott J. Street, Note, Poor Richard's Forgotten Press Clause: How Journalists
Can Use Original Intent to Protect Their Confidential Sources, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 463
(2007) (arguing that the historical record "clearly indicated that the Framers intended to protect
the press from government investigations, especially when reporters published articles
confidentially or obtained information through confidential sources." Id. at 495. Street said the
Framers learned the importance of confidential sources by observing the case of John Peter
Zenger, a colonist who published a criticism of New York's crown governor and then refused to
identify its author to the government. Id. at 463.).
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An excellent example of how the U.S. Supreme Court has filled in
those lines in libel law and has used the First Amendment to distribute
power between the government and the governed is the landmark case of
New York Times v. Sullivan.54 In that 1964 case, the Supreme Court
decided that government officials who sue for libel must prove the
allegedly libelous statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.",55 This difficult-to-
prove First Amendment standard was imposed on government officials in
order to empower critics of the government. Writing for the Sullivan
majority, Justice William Brennan explained the rule, in part, with this
quote from James Madison: "[T]he censorial power is in the people over
the Government, and not in the Government over the people. 56 The social
architecture created by Sullivan tipped the balance of power toward
government critics and away from government officials.
Just as the Framers left no record of what they thought were the ideal
rules of libel law, they left no recorded opinion as to whether the First
Amendment should allow reporters to protect their confidential sources and
information. In the area of reporter's privilege, as in libel, the U.S.
Supreme Court accepted the task of filling in some of the lines between the
broad strokes of the social architecture set down by the Framers. In
Branzburg v. Hayes, the landmark reporter's-privilege case, the Supreme
Court distributed power between federal grand juries and the media when it
ruled that journalists do not have a First Amendment right to refuse to
testify before a federal grand jury.
Writing for the Branzburg majority, Justice Byron White discussed the
important role of the grand jury in the criminal justice system and why the
grand jury needs the power to subpoena witnesses.58 He pointed out that
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." 59 Historically, White
said, the grand jury has protected "the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society
of standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether
a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power
or by malice and personal ill will."
60
54. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. Id. at 280.
56. Id. at 282 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)).
57. 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
58. Id. at 686-88.
59. Id. at 687 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1).
60. Id. at 687 n.23 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).
[31:3
More directly to the issue of the power of the grand jury, White said:
Because its task is to inquire into the existence of possible
criminal conduct and to return only well-founded indictments,
its investigative powers are necessarily broad. "It is a grand
inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by
questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of
the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular
individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of
crime."
61
To fulfill its role as a criminal investigator, the grand jury has the
power to subpoena witnesses. Thus the Court declined to create a
testimonial privilege for journalists subpoenaed to testify before a federal
grand jury. 2  The Court noted that whereas a number of states had
provided reporters a testimonial privilege, most states had not done SO 6 3 and
neither had Congress.64
Justice Potter Stewart, writing for four dissenters, agreed with White
that the grand jury played an important role in the administration of justice
and that to fulfill that role "the grand jury must have available to it every
man's relevant evidence.' 65 However, Stewart expressed concern about the
grand jury's "unbridled subpoena power' 66 and argued that the rule that
every person's evidence must be available to the grand jury never had been
and never should be absolute.67 Stewart pointed out that the rule that every
person's evidence must be available to the grand jury long had been limited
by the evidentiary privileges of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments and
those of common law.6 8 Stewart also cited cases in which the Supreme
Court previously had ruled that "for special reasons' 69 or to protect "a very
61. 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
62. Id. at 690.
63. At the time Branzburg was decided, seventeen states had shield laws. Id. at 691
(citations omitted).
64. Leslie Siegal, Note, Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter
Shield Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of News Sources and
Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 507-08 (2006) (discussing the fact that Congress had
considered shield law legislation numerous times since 1929 but never adopted a shield law).
65. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 737 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 732-33.
67. Id. at 737.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
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real interest ' '70 witnesses could not be compelled to testify. One such
interest "must surely be the First Amendment protection of a confidential
relationship . . . ," Stewart argued.7'
Continuing his critique of the way the Court majority was distributing
power between grand juries and the media, Stewart argued that safeguards
developed by the Court to limit the power of legislative and executive
investigators should apply to grand juries, too.72 "Surely the function of the
grand jury to aid in the enforcement of the law is no more important than
the function of the legislature, and its committees, to make the law," he
reasoned.73
Justice Lewis Powell's concurring opinion demonstrated a similar
concern about the proper distribution of power between grand juries and
the media. Powell wrote that he wanted to emphasize that the Court's
ruling "does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news
or in safeguarding their sources., 74 Also, he wrote, it does not mean
... that state and federal authorities are free to "annex" the
news media as "an investigative arm of government." The
solicitude repeatedly shown by this Court for First Amendment
freedoms should be sufficient assurance against any such effort,
even if one seriously believed that the media-properly free and
untrammeled in the fullest sense of these terms-were not able
to protect themselves.75
Powell warned that government harassment of journalists would not be
tolerated.76
The Branzburg Court did not decide whether journalists have a First
Amendment right to refuse to testify in federal proceedings other than
grand juries or how power should be distributed in cases that do not involve
grand juries.77 The Court explicitly left that task to Congress.78
70. Id. (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, at 332 (1950)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 740-41.
73. Id. at 741.
74. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 709-10.
77. Id. at 682 (explaining that "[t]he sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to
respond to grand jury subpoenas ... ").
78. Id. at 706 (noting that "[a]t the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine
whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and
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Members of Congress responded by quickly introducing six shield law
bills, and, within a year, sixty-five bills had been introduced. 79 Ninety-nine
bills were introduced between 1973 and 1978.80 In fact, Congress had been
discussing a federal shield law off and on since 1929.81 None of the bills
was adopted, however. 82 Wendy N. Davis explained that the bills failed
because the media "disagreed about what the bills should include. 83
With the Framers, the Supreme Court, and the Congress all having
failed to draw a social architecture that fully resolved the reporter's
privilege issue, the lower federal courts assumed the task.84  The lower
federal courts issued a series of opinions between 1972 and 2003 that
granted journalists generous protection against having to reveal
confidential sources and information in judicial proceedings other than
federal grand jury proceedings. 85 Those lower courts recognized a First
Amendment-based testimonial privilege for reporters based on their
reinterpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Branzburg. The lower
courts emphasized the limited nature of the majority's opinion in
Branzburg and read Justice Powell's "enigmatic concurring opinion ''86 as a
vote in favor of a qualified First Amendment privilege. They concluded
that a majority of the Court favored a qualified reporter's privilege.
87
rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally
important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.").
79. A Short History of Attempts to Pass a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & THE L., Fall
2004, at 9.
80. Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press: More Courts Are Forcing Reporters to
Testify As Judges Reconsider Media Privilege, 91 A.B.A. J. 22, March 2005, at 23.
81. Siegal, supra note 64.
82. See generally, Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
233 (1974); Mark Neubauer, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REv. 160 (1976).
83. Davis, supra note 80, at 23.
84. In addition to the important-and disputed-First Amendment-based reporter's
privilege, protection has been granted to reporters based on U.S. Department of Justice rules,
judicial rules of evidence, and common law. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have
adopted shield laws, and the media rely heavily on them in state court proceedings. See, e.g.,
Bruno & Stillman, Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Baker v. F & F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979);
LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Corp., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Farr v.
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1986).
85. See cases cited supra note 84.
86. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining:
Branzburg v. Hayes .. involving as it did the right of a
journalist to withhold disclosure of confidential sources from a grand
jury investigating criminal activities, is only of tangential relevance to
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This support for a reporter's privilege began to unravel in the late
1990s when two U.S. Courts of Appeals ruled there was no federal
privilege for reporters to refuse to reveal nonconfidential information in
criminal or civil cases. 88 Then in 2003 in McKevitt v. Pallasch8 9 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit "appeared to question the
existence of any journalist's privilege in federal courts .... ,90 The
influential Judge Richard Posner wrote for the unanimous court:
Some of the cases that recognize the privilege ... essentially
ignore Branzburg ... some treat the "majority" opinion in
Branzburg as actually just a plurality opinion,.., some
audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter's
privilege.... The approaches that these decisions take to the
issue of privilege can certainly be questioned .... 91
this case. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority of five justices,
stated that "the sole issue before [the Court] is the obligation of
reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of
crime." No such criminal overtones color the facts in this civil case.
The Court in Branzburg... applied traditional First Amendment
doctrine, which teaches that constitutional rights secured by the First
Amendment cannot be infringed absent a "compelling" or
"paramount" state interest,.., and found such an overriding interest
in the investigation of crime by the grand jury which "[secures] the
safety of the person and property of the citizen."
We note that Mr. Justice Powell, in a separate concurrence,
emphasized the limited nature of the Court's holding, and expressly
stated that in his view Branzburg did not compel a journalist "to give
information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the
subject of the [grand jury] investigation." Significantly, he said that
even in criminal proceedings, "[t]he asserted claim to privilege should
be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.")
(citations omitted).
88. In 1998, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that there was no federal
privilege protecting nonconfidential information subpoenaed in a criminal case. United States v.
Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998). Later that same year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled that there was no federal privilege for protecting nonconfidential
information subpoenaed in a civil case. Gonzales v. NBC, 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998). The
Second Circuit reversed itself in part on reconsideration. Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d
Cir. 1999) (recognizing a qualified journalist's privilege to protect both confidential and
nonconfidential materials in a civil case).
89. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
90. See Fargo, The Year, supra note 20, at 1086.
91. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Beginning in 2001, unprecedented numbers of journalists who refused
to comply with federal grand jury subpoenas began being sent to jail or
fined.92 Among them was Vanessa Leggett, an aspiring book author who
spent 168 days in jail in 2001 and 2002.93 More famously, New York Times
reporter Judith Miller spent 85 days in jail in 2005.9 4 The record for the
longest time in jail was set by Joshua Wolf, a California video blogger and
freelance journalist who was incarcerated for 226 days in 2006 and 2007.95
In all, five journalists have spent time in jail or under house arrest since
1998.96 Many others have paid costly fines or settlements.97
The Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes and the lower
courts' interpretation of that case obviously have not resolved questions
about the extent to which journalists are protected by a First Amendment-
based testimonial privilege. Neither have the courts conclusively drawn a
social architecture that clarifies how power should be distributed between
the federal government and the media. Consequently, Congress again has
begun considering shield law proposals.98
92. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Reporters and Federal Subpoenas,
available at http://www.rcfp.org/shields-and subpoenas.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008)
(tracking media subpoena cases).
93. See Ross E. Milloy, Writer Who Was Jailed in Notes Dispute is Freed, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2002, at A8. Leggett went to jail for refusing to hand over research materials she had
gathered while working on a book about a Houston murder. Id.
94. See David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free From Jail; She Will Testify,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al. Miller went to jail for refusing to reveal who in the federal
government told her Valerie Plame was a CIA agent. Id.
95. See Elizabeth Soja, Behind Bars: Josh Wolf Has Become the Longest-jailed Journalist
in Recent American History, NEWS MEDIA & THE L., Winter 2007, at 14. Wolf went to jail for
refusing to turn over to a federal court his videotape of a political protest during which a police
car was damaged. Id.
96. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Paying the Price: A Recent Census
of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited
July 28, 2008).
97. See Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2005, at Al; Grant Penrod, A Journalist's Home is His Prison, NEWS MEDIA & THE L. Winter
2005, at 10; Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 13 Mass. L. Rep. I (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001),
affd, 822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005); Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, Settlement Reached in Lee Case Involving Reporter's Subpoena,
http://rcfp.org/news/2006/0602-con-settle.html (last visited June 25, 2008).
98. Federal shield legislation was introduced in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
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III. Recent Federal Shield Law Proposals
Six shield law bills were introduced in the 109th Congress (2005-
2006), but none was passed.99 The most important bills'00 were the Free
Speech Protection Act bill (S. 369) introduced by Sen. Christopher Dodd
(D-Conn.) in 2005101 and the Free Flow of Information Act bills (Senate
Bill 1419 and House Bill 3323) introduced by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
and Rep. Mike Pence (R-Ind.) that same year.10 2 The Lugar and Pence bills
were identical.
The bills varied in terms of the protection they would have afforded to
journalists who did not want to reveal the identities of confidential sources,
the protection the bills would have afforded to journalists attempting to
protect other information and materials, exceptions to the privilege,
definitions of those who could claim the privilege, and the types of
proceedings in which the privilege could be claimed. For example, Sen.
Dodd's bill would have created an absolute privilege for reporters to
protect the identities of their sources, even without a promise of
confidentiality. 10 3 The Lugar/Pence bill would have granted reporters the
right to protect the identities of sources in all but some national security
cases. 10 4 Both would have provided a qualified privilege not to reveal other
information. 105 Under Dodd's bill, the qualified privilege meant that the
party seeking to compel a journalist to reveal information other than the
identity of a source would have had to prove three things: "(1) the news or
information is critical and necessary to the resolution of a significant legal
issue... ;" "(2) the news or information could not be obtained by any
alternative means; and (3) there is an overriding public interest in the
99. In addition to the three bills from the 109th Congress discussed in this section, there
were earlier versions of the Lugar/Pence legislation. See Brigid Sweeney, Lugar, Pence push
shield law, http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=35541. There were
also the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005), and the Free Flow of
Information Act, H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005), which were identical, and a 2006 amended bill
introduced by Lugar, the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006).
100. They were the most important shield law bills introduced in the 109th Congress in terms of
the numbers of co-sponsors they had. See Fargo, Analyzing, supra note 20, at 49 (comparing the
Dodd and Lugar/Pence bills in the 109th Congress). They also were most important in terms of
the attention they received at Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. See, e.g, Senate Hearing
2005-B, supra note 21 (discussing Lugar's bill); Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16
(discussing the Lugar/Pence and the Dodd bills).
101. Free Speech Protection Act, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005).
102. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Flow of Information
Act, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005).
103. Free Speech Protection Act, S. 369, 109th Cong. § 3(a)(l) (2005).
104. S. 1419 at § 2(a)(3)(A)-(C).
105. Id. at § 2(a)(1); id. at § 2(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii); id. at § 2(a)(2)(B); S. 369 at § 3(a)(l); id. at §
3(a)(2)(A)-(F).
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disclosure."10 6 The qualified privilege outlined in the Lugar/Pence bills
was similar but more complicated. For example, like Dodd's bill, the
Lugar/Pence bills required a party seeking to compel a journalist to testify
to prove the journalist's information was essential to the resolution of the
case and could not be obtained elsewhere. 10 7  The Lugar/Pence bills,
however, had slightly different rules for criminal and civil cases'0 8 and
stipulated that a journalist's compelled testimony should be narrowly
tailored in terms of both subject matter and period of time covered and, to
the extent possible, "be limited to the purpose of verifying published
information or describing any surrounding circumstances relevant to the
accuracy of such published information ....
The Dodd bill would have granted the testimonial privilege to anyone
who "engages in the gathering of news or information"' 10 and "has the
intent, at the beginning of the process of gathering news or information, to
disseminate the news or information to the public.""' The Lugar/Pence
bills would have protected any entity or employee who "disseminates
information by print, broadcast, cable, satellite, mechanical, photographic,
electronic, or other means.... ,,1t2 Finally, whereas Dodd's bill would
have applied in proceedings of all three branches of the federal
government," 3 the Lugar/Pence bills would have applied to judicial and
executive branch proceedings, but not to Congressional proceedings. 1
4
Shield law bills came closer than ever to becoming law in the 110th
Congress (2007-2008). The Free Flow of Information Act bill (House Bill
2102), which was introduced by Rep. Rick Boucher (D-Va.), was passed
overwhelmingly by the House in 2007.115 At about the same time that the
House approved its bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent a similar bill
with the identical name to the Senate floor, where no vote was taken." 
6
The Senate's bill, 2035, was introduced by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.).
106. S. 369 At § 4(a)(1)-(3).
107. S. 1419 at § 2(a)(2)(B); id. at § 2(a)(1).
108. See id. at § 2(a)(2)(A)-(B).
109. Id. at § 2(b)(1)-(2).
110. S. 369 at. § 2(I)(A).
111. Id. at § 2(1)(B).
112. S. 1419 at § 5(2)(A)-(C).
113. S. 369 at § 3(a) (2005).
114. S. 1419 at § 5(4) (2005).
115. Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007). The vote was 398 to 21.
See supra note 1.
116. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007). The committee approved
the bill by a vote of fifteen to four. SIP Leaders Call for Public Action in Senate Push, SPJ
NEWS, July 18, 2008, http://www.spj.org/news.asp?REF=816. A third bill, identical to the
legislation passed by the House, was introduced by Sen. Lugar. Free Flow of Information Act, S.
1267, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Both of the 2007 bills were more complex and included more exceptions to
the testimonial privilege than earlier bills.
For example, the bill passed by the House would have provided a
qualified privilege for the protection of both confidential sources and
information. 117 In the context of that bill, the qualified privilege meant
journalists could not be compelled to reveal confidential sources or
information unless the sources or information were needed for one of four
purposes: "to prevent, or to identify a perpetrator of, an act of terrorism" or
other harm to national security; to prevent "imminent death or significant
bodily harm"; to reveal the sources of leaks of trade secrets of significant
value, individually identifiable health information, or other personal or
financial information revealed in violation of existing federal laws; or to
identify persons who illegally disclosed classified information that can
harm national security. 1' 8 In all cases the shield law also would have
required a court to balance "the public interest in compelling disclosure of
the information or document involved" against "the public interest in
gathering or dissemination of news or information."' 19
The privilege outlined in the House bill would have protected a person
"who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes,
edits, reports, or publishes news or information that concerns local,
national, or international events or other matters of public interest for
dissemination to the public for a substantial part of the person's livelihood
or for substantial financial gain., 120 The proposed law also would have
protected a reporter's supervisor and employer. 121 The law explicitly did
not cover terrorists, terrorist organizations, foreign powers, or agents of
foreign powers acting as journalists. 122  It also would not protect a
journalist who was an eyewitness to alleged criminal or tortuous
conduct. 123 Finally, the House bill's privilege would have applied any time
the federal executive or judicial branch or an administrative agency-but
not Congress-attempted to compel testimony from a journalist in any
matter arising under federal law.'
2 4
While the 2007 Senate bill (Senate Bill 2035) was similar to the House
bill, there were several significant differences. Like the House bill, the
Senate bill would have provided journalists a qualified testimonial privilege
117. H.R. 2102 at § 2(a).
118. Id. at § 3(a)-(c).
119. Id. at § 2(a)(4).
120. Id. at § 4(2).
121. Id.
122. Id. at § 4(2)(A)-(E).
123. Id. at § 2(e).
124. Id. at § 4(4).
to protect both confidential sources and other information.125  The
qualifications were different, however. Under the Senate bill, reporters
could not be compelled to testify unless the party seeking to compel
testimony could prove that he had "exhausted all reasonable alternative
sources"'' 26 of the information and that "nondisclosure of the information
would be contrary to the public interest." 127 Then, in a criminal case, the
party seeking to compel testimony also would have had to demonstrate that
"(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred" and
that "(ii) the testimony or document sought is essential to the investigation
7128or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution ...." In a
criminal case involving the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified
information by a person with authorized access to such information, the
party seeking to compel testimony also would have had to prove the
disclosure of the classified information "has caused or will cause
significant, clear, and articulable harm to the national security .... ,,129 In a
non-criminal case, the party seeking to compel disclosure would have had
to show "the testimony or document sought is essential to the resolution of
the matter ... ,,130
Like the House bill, the Senate bill would not have granted a
testimonial privilege when a journalist had been an eyewitnesses to
criminal or tortuous conduct; when a reporter's testimony was needed to
prevent death, kidnapping, or substantial bodily harm; or when the
testimony was needed to prevent terrorist activity or harm to national
security. 131 The Senate bill would not, however, have denied the privilege
in cases in which a journalist was subpoenaed to identify a person who had
leaked trade secrets, as the House bill did.
Unlike the House bill, which would have protected nonconfidential as
well as confidential information, the Senate bill would have protected only
sources and information obtained by a reporter who made a promise of
confidentiality with the source. 132 Also, in defining who would be covered
by the bill, the Senate bill did not require that a covered person gather and
disseminate information "for a substantial part of their livelihood," as the
House bill did.
133
125. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2035, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007).
126. Id. at § 2(a)(1).
127. Id. at § 2(a)(3).
128. Id. at § 2 (a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
129. Id. at § 2 (a)(2)(A)(iii).
130. Id. at § 2 (a)(2)(B).
131. Id. at §§ 3-5.
132. Id. at § 7(1)-(2).
133. Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007).
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IV. The Shield Law Hearings and Debate:
Drawing Social Architecture
In terms both explicit and implicit, the federal shield law hearings and
debate focused largely on issues of power. For example, participants in the
proceedings discussed at length the law's possible impact on the separation
of powers among the branches of the federal government1 34  and two
closely related issues: the law's effect on the power of the executive branch
to fight terrorism and other crimes, and the law's effect on the power of the
media to scrutinize the operation of the government and contribute to an
informed citizenry.135  All of these issues are fundamental to social
architecture. Congress also discussed the context of the anticipated social
architecture.1 36 Context, in these discussions, meant the current events that
argued either for or against a shield law.
A. Separation of Powers
At the heart of the debate over the proposed shield law was
disagreement about how power should be divided among the branches of
the government. The U.S. Department of Justice opposed the shield law on
the grounds that the law would improperly reassign some of its national
security responsibilities to the judicial branch by allowing unqualified
judges, not the Justice Department, to decide whether journalists could be
compelled to testify. 137  Others countered that judges are qualified to
decide how to apply a shield law in cases with national security
implications because judges already deal with national security matters.
38
Moreover, the Justice Department argued in 2005 that Congress did not
have the power to adopt a shield law because the U.S. Supreme Court
already had ruled there was no reporter's privilege. 
139
134. See infra notes 137-63 and accompanying text; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra
note 16, at 25-26 (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att'y Gen.) (testifying that a shield law
would make a "dramatic structural change" in current law enforcement practice by giving the
courts the power to decide national security questions. This, she said, "would transfer to the
judiciary authority over law enforcement determinations reserved by the Constitution to the
Executive branch.").
135. See infra notes 164-257 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 258-89 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra
note 16, at 25-26 (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att'y Gen.) (arguing that the proposed
shield law "not only cedes to the judiciary the authority to determine what does and does not
harm the national security, it also gives courts to authority to override the national security
interest where the court deems that interest insufficiently compelling-even when harm to the
national security is established.").
138. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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Justice Department representatives were the most outspoken opponents
of the federal shield law. 140  Testifying before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 2005, U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg enumerated five
specific objections to the proposed law. 14 1 The objection most obviously
about the separation of powers within the federal government was that the
shield law would take away some of the Justice Department's authority-
its authority to use its own rules to decide whether to subpoena
journalists-and would give that authority to the courts. 142 In the view of
the Justice Department, the issue was the proper scope of the law
enforcement and national security powers of the executive branch relative
to the powers of the judicial branch.
143
Rosenberg said that "any legislation that would impair the discretion of
the Attorney General to issue press subpoenas-or to exercise any other
investigative options in the exercise of the President's constitutional
powers-is unwarranted." 144 Likewise, Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty reminded the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2006 that the U.S.
Constitution assigned responsibility for national security to the executive
branch of the federal government. 145 He told the committee that the shield
law would undermine the separation of powers by shifting law enforcement
decisions from the executive branch to the judicial branch, a shift he called
"extraordinarily serious in the national security area .... ,,46 He said the
140. The U.S. Department of Justice was represented at different times by U.S. Attorney
Chuck Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General Rachel L. Brand, and Deputy Attorney General
Paul J. McNulty.
141. Rosenberg's objections were that 1) the shield law would replace the department's
flexible, voluntary guidelines for issuing subpoenas to journalists, which worked well, with
"inflexible, mandatory" standards; 2) the law would bar the government from obtaining
information from the media with the too-narrow exception of cases involving "imminent and
actual harm to security;" 3) the law would take away the Justice Department's authority to decide
whether to subpoena journalists and give that power to the courts; 4) the law would bar Justice
Department subpoenas to third parties that could lead to the identification of a reporter's
confidential source; and 5) the law would protect potentially dangerous foreign media, including
those sponsored by terrorist organizations. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of
Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y). See also, House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 20-28 (statement
of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att'y Gen.) (offering a similar list of concerns on behalf of the
Department of Justice).
142. See Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
143. See id.; Reporters' Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law
Enforcement: Hearing on S. 2381 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing 2006] (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
binlgetdoc.cgidbname= 109_senate-hearings&docid=f:34205.pdf.
144. See Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
145. See Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 6 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Att'y Gen.).
146. Id. at 4.
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executive branch has "the full array of information necessary to make
informed and balanced national security judgments," and the shield law
would thrust courts "into altogether unfamiliar territory of having to weigh
national security interests against the public's interest in'receiving certain
news. As numerous judges have recognized, the courts lack the
institutional resources and expertise to make those decisions.
1 47
McNulty said the proposed legislation also would assign the courts the
task of deciding whether information is properly classified in cases
involving government leaks. 148 He cautioned that this would be "a big
undertaking" for judges because it would require them to know what harm
would occur if classified information were to get into the hands of the
enemy. 49
Countering that argument, Bruce A. Baird, a former assistant U.S.
attorney, responded at the same Senate hearing that he could not
understand the argument that federal judges are incapable of deciding
national security issues. 150 He told the Senate Judiciary Committee:
We rely on judges to make very complicated decisions about
balancing tests. We require that in many areas of law. We
require it every day .... I recall a judge who taught himself
patent law and electrical engineering to decide a case, wrote a
300-page opinion full of circuit diagrams.
... You put judges on the bench who have that ability .... 151
Theodore B. Olson, a former solicitor general, testified that judges
already are involved in deciding whether reporters must testify in national
security cases, and they will continue to be involved even if there is no
federal shield law. 152 He said:
147. Id. (arguing also that the proposed legislation presents "an impossible task for the court
because it requires the court to know so much about the significance of a harm and be able to say
that this disclosure, which might, by the way, involve some tactic or some effort by the
Government that is controversial and a matter of public discussion, and a judge is going to look at
that, every different judge looking at it in a different way, and say that that outweighs this harm."
Id. at 6.).
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 20 (statement of Bruce A. Baird, Former U.S. Att'y).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 24 (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Former Solicitor Gen.). Before being
appointed solicitor general in 2001, Olson successfully represented George W. Bush in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, the case that essentially decided the 2000 presidential election. More directly
related to the matter of a federal shield law, Olson wrote a brief on behalf of one of the
subpoenaed journalists in the Wen Ho Lee case. For a brief summary of that case, see Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Shields and Subpoenas: The Reporter's Privilege in Federal
Courts, http://www.rcfp.org/shields-and-subpoenas.html.
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What I think Mr. McNulty [of the Justice Department] did not
acknowledge is that there is going to be judicial analysis of this
process anyway. The Department standards do not require the
Department to go to a judge. But what is going to happen is the
reporter is going to decline to respond to the subpoena. He is
going to make a motion to quash. There is going to be a motion
before a judge to hold the reporter in contempt for not
responding to the subpoena .... So a judge is going to be
considering these questions .... ,1s 3
Furthermore, Olson' 54 and Baird 155 both pointed out that federal judges
make national security decisions in several other contexts, including
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) cases.1
56
Also debated during the 2005 Senate hearings was the core issue of
who should have the power-the courts or Congress-to decide whether
there should be a federal reporter's privilege.157 U.S. Attorney Rosenberg,
speaking on behalf of the Justice Department, opposed the shield law in
part because he said it would "effectively overrule" the Supreme Court's
decision in Branzburg v. Hayes by creating a privilege that has not been
recognized by the Court.158 In Branzburg, the Court held journalists had no
First Amendment right to refuse to testify before a federal grand jury.
First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams countered that the Branzburg
case "could hardly be clearer" that Congress has the power to decide
whether to adopt a federal shield law. 159 Abrams said:
The language of the court is clear. At the federal level, the court
said, Congress has the freedom to determine whether a statutory
newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable, and to fashion
153. See Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 24.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 21 (statement of Bruce A. Baird, Former U.S. Att'y).
156. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 established new procedures and
courts to authorize electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence operations in the United States.
The statute created the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court composed of eleven
federal judges who meet in secret to hear requests from the attorney general for surveillance
warrants, and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, a panel of three federal
judges. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-62 (2008).
157. This issue was raised briefly in the 2007 House hearing. See House Hearing 2007,
supra note 16, at 9 (statement of Rep. Conyers, Chair, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
158. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
159. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 17 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Att'y).
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standards and rules as narrow [or as] broad as deemed necessary.
So this is within your purview and it is up to you to decide what
steps if any, to take in this area.'
60
David Westin, president of ABC News, agreed with Abrams.' 61 He
testified,
More than once, the federal courts-beginning with the
Supreme Court more than 30 years ago [in Branzburg] and
continuing right through to the court of appeals in Ms. [Judith]
Miller's case-have invited Congress to step in and to create a
uniform, federal rule governing whether and when federal
prosecutors can force reporters to reveal their confidential
sources. 162
He said, "the time has come" for Congress to "take up the Supreme Court's
invitation at long last .. ,163
B. Executive Branch Power to Fight Terrorism and Other Crimes
In addition to focusing on the distribution of power among the
branches of government, much of the federal shield law debate has focused
more narrowly on the power of the Justice Department itself. Department
officials argued that the shield law would impair the department's ability-
its power-to fight terrorism and other crimes by making it more difficult,
if not impossible, to obtain critical information from journalists and
others.1 64 Justice Department officials also posited that a shield law was
unnecessary because existing Justice Department guidelines for issuing
subpoenas to journalists already struck the proper balance between the
160. Id.
161. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of David Westin, President, ABC
News).
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also, Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 20 (statement of Lee Levine,
Att'y) (agreeing with Abrams's reading of Branzburg); id. at 33 (statement of Sen. Feingold,
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) (explaining that "Branzburg stands for the proposition
that the protection of the identity of anonymous sources is not required in the First Amendment.
But many judges in these cases have invited Congress to legislate. This is an area where Congress
has the power and the responsibility to set out the parameters under which testimony of this kind
can be compelled."). In fact, the Court said in Branzburg, "At the federal level, Congress has
freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil
discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may
dictate." 408 U.S. at 706.
164. See infra notes 167-94 and accompanying text.
needs of law enforcement and the needs of the media. 165  Shield law
supporters, on the other hand, argued that a shield law would actually help
fight crime while also reining in the Justice Department's "overzealous"
special prosecutors. 1
66
U.S. Attorney Rosenberg testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 2005 that a federal shield law would "interfere... in an
unnecessary and harmful way"'167 with the department's ability "to
effectively enforce the law, fight terrorism, and protect national
security.'' 168 Specifically, Rosenberg argued that the proposed shield law
would deprive the department of the flexibility it needs to fight crime and
prevent the government from obtaining information from media sources
except in cases involving "imminent and actual harm to national
security.,, 169  He said, further, a shield law would require the Justice
Department to reveal in open court the reasons it needed a subpoena, and
bar subpoenas to non-media parties that could lead to the discovery of the
identity of a source. 170 "This [the shield law] may make it difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain vital information on how national security
information was disclosed [by those illegally leaking classified government
information] and to whom it was disclosed," Rosenberg said.'
7'
Rachel L. Brand, an assistant attorney general who represented the
Department of Justice at the 2007 House Judiciary Committee hearing,
noted that President Bush objected to the shield law because of his concern
about leaks of classified information. 172 "As President Bush has said,...
leaks [of classified information] have threatened our national security,
damaged our ability to pursue terrorists, and put our citizens and armed
forces at risk," Bland testified. 173  Bland said that one of the Justice
Department's most significant concerns about the proposed shield law was
that the law would make it "virtually impossible" to investigate and
prosecute leaks of classified national security information.
174
165. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
167. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
168. Id.
169. Id. (discussing the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 22 (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att'y
Gen.).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 18.
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Rep. Darrell E. Issa (R-Calif.) agreed that federal prosecutors must be
empowered to investigate illegal leaks of national security information to
the news media.175 He said:
We simply cannot erect obstacles which hamstring Federal law
enforcement when sensitive government secrets are divulged.
Such disclosures can be treasonous, and reporters should not be
able to protect individuals who jeopardize our national security.
American lives are more important than the privilege of
anonymity that reporters promise to a source who is
compromising our nation's secrets. 176
Rep. Lamar S. Smith (R-Tex.) said that if the shield law is adopted,
"[t]he Department of Justice will be hamstrung as it goes about the
business of conducting investigations and prosecuting criminals."' 177 He
explained that under the bill being debated by the House, media subpoenas
would be allowed in national security cases only when there was a threat of
"imminent and actual harm."' 7 8  Thus, he said, the media could be
subpoenaed to testify only about prospective events, not past events. 1
79
For example, the Department may be able to acquire
information about a source's identity to prevent a terrorist
attack like September 11; but if al Qaeda decides to tell a media
outlet on September 12 how it planned and carried out the
attack, DOJ could not compel that media outlet to reveal its
terrorist sources while conducting an investigation.'
80
Furthermore, shield law opponents complained that the proposed law
listed several instances in which reporters could be subpoenaed, but those
exceptions to the testimonial privilege would not allow the Justice
Department to subpoena reporters in most of its criminal cases. 18 1 For
175. 153 CONG. REC. 156,H11587,11599 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter House
Debate] (statement of Rep. Issa).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 11590 (statement of Rep. Smith).
178. Id. (discussing the Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102, 1 10th Cong. (2007)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(A)-(C)
(2007) (listing these three exceptions to the reporter's privilege: 1) when disclosure of the identity
of a source is necessary to prevent imminent and actual harm to national security; 2) when
disclosure would prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm; or 3) when disclosure is
example, members of Congress said the government would not be able to
compel journalists to testify in cases involving child pornography, 182 child
molestation,' 83  sexual assault, '84 international smuggling,185  gang
violence, 186 murder, 187 and murder for hire, 188 or the illegal leaking of
individuals' Social Security numbers, 189 sealed court documents, 190 or of
the location of a domestic violence safe house.' 9'
U.S. Attorney Rosenberg also testified that requiring the Justice
Department to reveal in a public evidentiary hearing the reasons it needed
to subpoena the media would "place an unreasonable burden" on the
department' 92 and "would pose serious threats to grand jury secrecy and the
confidentiality of on-going [sic] criminal investigations."' 193 A provision of
the bill that would bar subpoenas to non-media parties that could lead to the
discovery of the identity of a source was "impractical" and would hamper
law enforcement efforts, he added. 194
While the Justice Department feared the shield law would undermine
its law enforcement power, shield law supporters argued that, to the
contrary, the law would actually empower the media to help fight crime
and would rein in the Justice Department's "overzealous" special
prosecutors. 195 For example, Philadelphia Inquirer Managing Editor Anne
Gordon said the Justice Department was wrong when it posited the shield
law would hamper law enforcement and threaten national security. 196 To
the contrary, Gordon said, forcing journalists to reveal their confidential
sources deprives the public of information it needs, and thereby hampers
law enforcement and threatens national security.' 97 She explained that
necessary to identify a person who has disclosed a trade secret, identifiable health information, or
other nonpublic personal information).
182. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11596 (statement of Rep. King).
183. Id. at HI 1590 (statement of Rep. Smith).
184. Id. at H 11596 (statement of Rep. King).
185. Id.; see also, id. at H 11590 (statement of Rep. Smith).
186. Id. (statement of Rep. Smith).
187. Id. at H 11593 (statement of Rep. Smith).
188. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
189. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11596 (statement of Rep. King).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
193. Id.
194. Id. (referring to the Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong.
(2005)).
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forcing the disclosure of media sources would "jeopardize the public
interest and security because concerned individuals, who fear for their own
safety, protection and well being, will be too afraid to bring information to
light."'198 Gordon also said:
The implication [of the Justice Department's objections to the
shield law] is that when the press tells its readers, as the
Inquirer recently did, for example - that nearby refineries are
vulnerable to attack and accidents that would imperil hundreds
of thousands, it is threatening national security. The threat
comes not from inadequate protection of these sites; [sic] the
Justice Department seems to reason, but from the use of
confidential sources to reveal these types of stories. In fact,
NOT publishing this material threatens national security. 99
Many who participated in the hearings and debate expressed concern
that federal special prosecutors had too much power. There were numerous
references to "overzealous prosecutors,200 and to the fact that the Justice
Department guidelines governing media subpoenas do not apply to
subpoenas from special prosecutors. In addition, Sen. Dodd referred to
reporters landing "in a spider web spun by the Federal prosecutors. 2 °1
Norman Pearlstine, then editor-in-chief of Time magazine,20 2 quoted a
federal court judge in the Valerie Plame case as saying special prosecutors
have "vast power and immense discretion" 20 3 and there is a "a concomitant
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 15 (statement of William Safire,
Columnist, NEW YORK TIMES) (testifying that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
laws "to stop overzealous prosecutors from ... forcing reporters to identify sources"); House
Debate, supra note 175, at 11597 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (describing Vanessa Leggett as
the victim of "threats and intimidation by an overzealous prosecution ....").
201. 152 CONG. REC. 62,S4803 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) [hereinafter Introduction]
(statement of Sen. Dodd).
202. Pearlstine is now a senior advisor on telecommunications and media for The Carlyle
Group. See normanpearlstine.com, About the Author, http://www.normanpearlstine.com/
theauthor.html. While at Time, he complied with a federal court subpoena to hand over a
reporter's notes in the investigation of who leaked that information that Valerie Plame was a
covert CIA agent. Daniela Deane, Time Magazine to Cooperate in Plame Case Probe, June 30,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/30/AR2005063000205
.html.
203. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16 (statement of Norman Pearlstine, Editor, TIME)
(quoting Judge David S. Tatel in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 999
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1579&wit-id=4505.
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,,204
risk of overzealousness .... New York Times columnist Safire said he
could not tell the Senate Judiciary Committee his true feelings about the
conduct of federal prosecutors because he feared government retaliation
against Judith Miller, who was then in federal prison.20 5 "I am seething
inside because I cannot tell you-with no holds barred-what I think of the
unchecked abuse of prosecutorial discretion. . . ," Safire said.2°6
Deputy Attorney General McNulty countered that since the Justice
Department had never abused its subpoena power, a federal shield law that
would curtail that power was unnecessary.20 7 He reported that the Justice
Department had subpoenaed source information from the media in fewer
than 20 cases in the past 15 years; this fact, he said, was evidence that the
department's guidelines governing media subpoenas adequately balanced
the department's need for evidence in criminal proceedings against the
interests of the free press.20 8 The Justice Department guidelines require
that the news media be subpoenaed only as a last resort to obtain important
information about a criminal case, and then the attorney general must
approve each contested subpoena.20 9
Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.) offered different figures on subpoenas and
described a too-powerful executive branch in need of public and press
210scrutiny. Stark said:
Predictably, George Bush's Department of Justice opposes
today's legislation, in part because the Administration issued
more than 300 subpoenas last year alone. That's
204. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 999 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
205. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 16 (statement of William Safire, Columnist,
NEW YORK TIMES).
206. Id.; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 69 (statement of William F. Safire,
Columnist, NEW YORK TIMES) (testifying that he curbed his criticism of the government's
treatment of Judith Miller because "I was chilled. And what chilled me? The prospect of the
prosecutor getting angry. And under the law, he had the right then to... take the next step and
cite her for criminal contempt and keep her in jail for years.").
207. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 3 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y
Gen.).
208. Id.; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 21 (statement of Rachel L. Brand,
Asst. Att'y Gen.) (testifying that "[t]he effectiveness of this policy, and the seriousness with
which it is treated within the Department, contradict the allegations some have made about the
Justice Department's alleged disregard for First Amendment principles."). Brand also testified
that "it is a reflection of the Department's abiding respect for First Amendment principles and the
vital role played by the press in our free society" that the Department had never prosecuted a
journalist for violating federal statutes that prohibit the disclosure of classified information.
House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 22.
209. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2009).
210. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11599 (statement of Rep. Stark).
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understandable. If I had a track record of wasting money on a
failing war, abusing civil liberties, suppressing scientific
research, and failing to enforce important consumer protections
and environmental regulations, I too would want to keep the
press and the public in the dark.21
At the 2007 House hearing, Department of Justice representatives and
others were still debating the number of subpoenas issued by the
department.212
Sen. Specter agreed with Rosenberg that the Justice Department's
guidelines worked well.213 In fact, he said, that assumption is where he and
his bill's co-sponsors started when they drafted their bill.214 However,
Specter voiced two concerns about the Justice Department's guidelines.
Both concerns suggest that Specter viewed the Justice Department as more
powerful than it should be and that he believed a shield law could remedy
that problem. First, Specter pointed out that the Justice Department's
guidelines do not apply to special prosecutors. 21 5 "Special prosecutors are
often called upon in cases that are politically sensitive, may potentially be
embarrassing to senior government officials, and are high profile-those
cases that seem to carry the greatest risk of an overzealous prosecutor
needlessly subpoenaing journalists," he said.216 Second, Specter said the
guidelines are enforced by the attorney general-not a neutral court.217
"This places the Attorney General in a difficult position; namely, the
primary check on Federal prosecutors' ability to subpoena journalists is the
nation's highest Federal prosecutor," Specter said.21 8 "Most Americans, I
211. Id.
212. Compare House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 75 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y)
(testifying that two dozen reporters currently or recently had been the subject of subpoenas for
confidential sources and "another dozen" had been held in contempt of court for refusing to
testify since 2001), and House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 91 (statement of Randall D.
Eliason, Law Professor) (testifying that "[y]ou have heard everybody here talk about the same
three or four cases all morning. It really is a handful of cases, and by and large, those cases
involved sources that were committing wrongdoing by leaking to the press.").
213. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4802 (statement of Sen. Specter).
214. Id.
215. Id. The Justice Department guidelines also do not apply to any part of the executive
branch of the federal government beyond the Justice Department, to the administrative agencies,
or to civil cases in federal court. That undoubtedly accounts for the disparity in the numbers of
subpoenas reported by McNulty and Stark. The proposed shield law would apply to the entire
executive branch and to the judicial branch, but not to Congress. See Senate Hearing 2006, supra
note 143 (statement of Sen. Specter).
216. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4802 (statement of Sen. Specter).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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believe, would feel more comfortable having the competing interests
weighed by a neutral judge instead of a political appointee who answers to
the President. 219 Specter said his proposed shield law would "in large
part" codify the Justice Department guidelines, but the law would also
apply those guidelines to special prosecutors and rely on courts rather than
"a political official" to decide whether a media subpoena is warranted. 220
Likewise, former Solicitor General Olson said:
Naturally the Department of Justice does not want its judgments
second-guessed by judges.... But we do not recoil from
judicial oversight of these types of decisions when it comes to
attorney-client or physician-patient privileges or search
warrants or FISA warrants. And there is no reason we should
reject it when it comes to a journalist's source of information.22'
He noted that thirty-nine state attorneys general were "not bashful about
protecting law enforcement prerogatives" and, yet, they supported a federal
shield law.222
Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) told the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the legislation being debated, which he cosponsored, "recognizes there
must be a balance. It recognizes we have to preserve a free press but
ensures that criminals are brought to justice. 223 He said that when there is
"an overriding public interest against disclosure,... the press must bend to
the needs of law enforcement. 224
C. Media Power to Scrutinize the Government and Inform Citizens
The shield law hearings and debate also included lengthy discussions
of media power, specifically: 1) the role of the media in a democratic
society and whether a shield law was needed to empower the media to
fulfill that role; 2) whether by issuing subpoenas to journalists the
government was making the media an arm of law enforcement and
undermining the independence of the media; and 3) whether the shield law
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 15 (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Former
Solicitor Gen.).
222. Id. (referring to the brief the state attorneys general filed with the U.S. Supreme Court
in the Valerie Plame case. Brief for States of Oklahoma, Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005), 2005 WL 1317523).
223. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 9 (statement of Sen. Schumer, Member,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
224. Id.
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would inappropriately place the media above the law. 5 These issues often
were debated in the lofty language of the Founding Fathers and democratic
principles.226
During the 2007 House debate, Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.)
described the role of the press in a democracy and the value of the shield
law in helping the media fulfill that role:
Today, we are here in an attempt to reclaim one of the most
fundamental principles enshrined by the Founding Fathers in
the first amendment to the Constitution. Freedom of the press
is the cornerstone of our democracy. Without it, we cannot
have a well-informed electorate and a government that truly
represents the will of the people.
The measure before us ... helps restore the independence of
the press so that it can perform its essential duty of getting
information to the public. The bill will ensure that members of
the press are free to utilize confidential sources without causing
harm to themselves or their sources ....227
In 2006, Sen. Dodd expressed similar lofty sentiments, quoting James
Madison as saying, "Popular government without popular information or
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce, or tragedy, or perhaps
both., 228  Pearlstine quoted from two U.S. Supreme Court cases to the
225. See infra notes 228-57 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra
note 16, at 15 (statement of Rep. Pence, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson as warning, "[o]ur liberty cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press,
nor that limited without the danger of losing it.").
227. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11589 (statement of Rep. Conyers); see also, Senate
Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 30 (statement of Sen. Durbin, Member, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary) (describing the role of the free press as "to put a check on the government, to expose
corruption, deception, abuse of power - clearly in the public interest of the United States."); 151
CONG. REC. 13,S1215 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lugar) (testifying that the
"cornerstone of our society is the open market of information which can be shared through ever
expanding mediums. The media serve as a conduit of information between our governments and
communities across the country."), 151 Cong. Rec. S1199-02, at *S1215 (Westlaw); Senate
Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 9 (statement of Sen. Schumer, Member, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary) (testifying that there is "a need to protect press independence. In order for the media to
do their job, we know it is important for them to use confidential sources." He explained that in
cases in which disclosure will not harm national security "I think every one of us would want the
reporter to be able to get the information and have it out, unless we want to change the whole
fabric as to the way this Government has been going for over 200 years.").
228. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4803 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (quoting Letter from
James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103
(Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons) (1910).
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effect that the press "was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials '229 and "has been a mighty
catalyst in awakening public interest in government affairs [and] exposing
corruption among public officers and employees ....230
Former Solicitor General Olson testified in 2006 about the watchdog
function of the media:
One of the most vital functions of our free and independent
press is to function as a watchdog on behalf of the people-
working to uncover stories that would otherwise go untold.
Journalists in pursuit of such stories often must obtain
information from individuals who, for fear of retribution or
retaliation, are unwilling to be publicly identified.231
Rep. Greg Walden (R-Or.), who graduated from journalism school and
owns radio stations, said during the 2007 House debate: "A vote for the
Free Flow of Information Act is a vote to protect citizens and taxpayers
from an ominous and oppressive government that seeks to silence its
critics. And in America, such government power would threaten our
freedom and our informed democracy.,
232
While supporters of the shield law used famous examples of
investigative reporting to substantiate the importance of reporters' use of
confidential sources, opponents of the shield law used similar examples to
argue that a federal shield law was unnecessary-that reporters were doing
just fine without a shield law. For example, attorney Lee Levine testified
in 2005 and 2007 that media subpoenas would threaten important reporting
like that on the Watergate scandal, on the BALCO performance-enhancing-
drugs scandal, and on the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq.233 Levine explained that those stories relied on confidential sources
who might not have talked to journalists if they had not been confident the
229. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16 (statement of Norman Pearlstine, Editor, TIME)
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfin?id= 1579&witid=4505.
230. Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965)).
231. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 14 (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Former
Solicitor Gen.).
232. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11593 (statement of Rep. Walden); see also, id. at
H. 11596 (statement of Rep. Pelosi) (testifying that "[s]peaking truth to power is vital to our
democracy today, as it has been throughout our history.").
233. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1 579&wit id=4505; see also, House
Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 41-46 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y) (providing a similar list
of stories that had relied on confidential sources).
2009]
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journalists could protect their identities.234 At a hearing the following year,
Cornell University Law Professor Steven D. Clymer pointed to two similar
stories-the National Security Agency wiretapping program and the CIA
detention of al Qaeda operatives overseas-as evidence that journalists can
and do investigate important stories without a federal shield law.235 Clymer
said the debate "boils down to the question of whether the present law in its
present form is an impediment to the free flow of information. And, quite
frankly, I think that is a hard case to make., 236 Clymer said the media's
continuing use of confidential sources "suggests to me that people who are
inclined to make leaks of that kind of information are going to make leaks
whether or not there is Federal protection for anonymous sources. 237
Media representatives, in addition to expressing concern about
preserving their watchdog powers, expressed concern that by forcing the
media to testify, the government was making the media an arm of law
enforcement.238 Media representatives insisted that they are not an arm of
law enforcement and being perceived as such would hamper their news-
gathering efforts. For example, Gordon of the Philadelphia Inquirer
testified:
Newspapers are not another arm of the government. When the
government subpoenas the work of reporters and uses that work
or testimony to convict someone, it undermines the public's
view of newspapers as neutral observers of events. The primary
job of a free press is to serve as a check on the abuses of
government. Not to help convict or indict.239
Westin, president of ABC News, agreed:
In our system of government, the press is-and must be
perceived to be-entirely independent of the government. If
234. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfin?id= 1579&witid=4508.
235. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 16 (statement of Steven D. Clymer, Law
Professor); see also, House Debate, supra note 175, at 11590 (statement of Rep. Smith) (arguing
that "the first amendment of the Constitution guarantees the press their freedom to report. And
for 200 years in this Nation, the press, in fact, has flourished. Information has flowed freely.
And this is why I believe the bill is simply a solution in search of a real problem.").
236. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 16 (statement of Steven D. Clymer, Law
Professor).
237. Id.
238. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
239. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Anne Gordon, Managing Editor,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER).
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those with whom we deal were to conclude that we were, in
effect, acting as potential fact-finders for the government, they
would be far less willing to tell us what they know. Indeed,
when it comes to our working overseas, such a perception could
literally endanger the lives and well-being of our reporters. 40
Safire said the media were "not the fingers at the end of the long arm of
the law" and argued that the government has "huge, powerful methods of
gaining evidence" about crime-without relying on the media.241  He
observed that the government can "put people under oath and threaten to
jail them if they don't tell the truth, it can subpoena e-mails. It can wiretap.
It can offer immunity that overcomes the Fifth Amendment.,
242
U.S. Attorney Rosenberg said the Justice Department realized that the
media play "a crucial role in keeping the American people informed of
what is happening overseas, in Washington, and in their hometown.,
243
Moreover, he said the media are "critical" to the department's crime-
prevention efforts. 244 "Every day across the country, reporters file stories
on the important work of the Department and thereby help to deter others
from committing crimes in the future," he said.245
The third issue regarding the media's power was whether a federal
shield law would improperly place the media above the law.246 Rep. Smith
said, for example:
Our Founders created a legal system where no one is above the
law. But if the media shield law passes, we will be carving out
an exception to that rule .... This is not what our Founders
intended when they created a free press. No one should be
above the law, not even the press.
247
240. Id. (statement of David Westin, President, ABC News).
241. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 25 (statement of William Safire, Columnist,
NEW YORK TIMES).
242. Id.
243. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 14 (statement of Rep. Boucher,
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (opining that the bill "does not give reporters a license
to break the law in the name of gathering news.").
247. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11597 (statement of Rep. Smith).
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Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) said the Senate needed to "be careful"
about protecting the press with a shield law.248 He explained:
I was thinking that if a spy comes into our country and gets
secure information and gives it to our enemy, we put him in jail,
and they can be convicted, I guess, of treason. If a reporter gets
information and published it to our enemies and to the whole
world, they get the Pulitzer Prize.249
Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa) agreed, "Some of the people who hide behind
the shield of journalism today routinely release classified national security
data and publish it as if it were their patriotic duty and hide behind the
shield of journalism.,,2 50 King said classified information had been leaked
to the New York Times, which published the information and jeopardized
national security.25'
Rep. Pence disagreed: "It is important to know what the bill does not
do. It does not give reporters a license to break the law, the right to
interfere with police or prosecutors; it simply gives journalists certain
rights and abilities to seek sources and report information without
intimidation. 252 Similarly, Sen. Dodd said the legislation was not about
conferring special rights on journalists.253 He said the law would not
permit "rule breaking, give reporters a license to break the law, or permit
reporters to interfere with crime prevention efforts., 2 54 He said that "it is
intended to protect the rights of all citizens to be informed and to inform,
including those speaking with journalists in confidence.,
255
Rep. Mark Udall (D-Colo.) seemed to concede that the shield law
might place the media above the law-but not unnecessarily.256  Udall
248. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4803 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
249. Id.
250. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11596 (statement of Rep. King).
251. Id. King did not clarify this reference; see also, House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at
53 (statement of Randall D. Eliason, Law Professor) (testifying that "[rieporters don't go to jail
because of the lack of a Federal privilege law. They go to jail because they are placing
themselves above the law that does exist and refusing to honor valid court orders, even when
there is a privilege.").
252. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11592 (statement of Rep. Pence).
253. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
254. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4801 (statement of Sen. Lugar); see also, Senate
Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 5 (statement of Sen. Lugar) (arguing that "the legislation does
not permit rule breaking. It does not give reporters a license to break the law in the name of
gathering news. It does not give reporters the right to interfere with police and prosecutors who
are trying to prevent crimes. The legislation does not prohibit compelling a reporter to testify.").
255. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 6.
256. See House Debate, supra note 175, at 11598 (statement of Rep. Udall).
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quoted from a newspaper article: "Reporters do not expect to be above the
law. But they should receive some protection so they can perform their
public service in ensuring the free flow of information and exposing
improper conduct without risking jail sentences.' 257
D. The Context of the Social Architecture
Context-especially the post-9/1 1 terrorist threat and the weakening
federal testimonial privilege for reporters-was at the heart of much of the
disagreement over the proposed federal shield law. Almost every
participant in the debate seemed to want to make law, or not, based on the
immediate situation as he or she saw it. Shield law opponents said the
government must be able to compel journalists to testify because the nation
continued to be threatened by terrorists.258 Shield law supporters said a
shield law was needed because uncertainty over the scope of the federal
reporter's privilege was having a chilling effect on the media.259
For example, in 2005, U.S. Attorney Rosenberg, who spoke in
opposition to the shield law, said that "[t]he events of the past four years
have shown that law enforcement must be more, rather than less, flexible to
meet the challenges posed by international terrorist organizations and
sophisticated criminal enterprises., 260 Also, Rep. Smith reported that the
president's advisers "believe the stakes are too high in a post-9/1 1 world to
support the Free Flow of Information Act. 261
Sen. Specter and others, on the other hand, offered the current disarray
of reporter's privilege law as evidence of the need for a shield law. Specter
said, "Rather than a clear, uniform standard for deciding claims of
journalist privilege, the Federal courts currently observe a 'crazy quilt' of
different judicial standards. 262  Pointing to the variations in reporter's
privilege law among the federal circuits and among the states, he
concluded: "There is little wonder that there is a growing consensus
concerning the need for a uniform journalists' privilege in Federal courts.
The system must be simplified. 263 Former Solicitor General Olson argued
257, Id. (quoting Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson, . . . Or Safeguards? Limited
Protections Are Vital to a Free Press, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A25).
258. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text
259. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
260. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y).
261. House Debate, supra note 175, at 11590 (statement of Rep. Smith).
262. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4801 (statement of Sen. Specter).
263. Id. at S4802 (explaining that five circuits have recognized a First Amendment-based
reporter's privilege in criminal cases in which the government is acting in good faith; four other
circuits apply a balancing test in criminal cases; nine circuits apply a balancing test in civil cases;
one circuit grants reporters no testimonial privilege in civil cases; two circuits have not decided
whether reporters have a testimonial privilege in criminal cases; and forty-nine states have
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that a federal shield was needed to eliminate the inconsistencies in the
"hodgepodge" of federal reporter's privilege law that hampered the press in
its performance of its watchdog function. 264  He said, "Reporters cannot
foresee where and when they may be summoned into court for questions
regarding a particular story, and their editors, publishers, and lawyers are
similarly hamstrung by the confusion and can provide little help. 265
Sen. Dodd said journalists were in jail because "they have committed
the 'offense' of being journalists" and "[t]he chilling effect is obvious.,
266
We can only speculate as to how many editors and publishers
put the brakes on a story for fear that it could land one of their
reporters in a spider web spun by the Federal prosecutors that
could include prison. If citizens with knowledge of wrongdoing
could not or would not come forward to share what they know
in confidence with members of the press, serious journalism
would cease to exist, in my view. Serious wrongs would
remain unexposed. The scandals known as Watergate, the
Enron failure, the Abu Ghraib prison photos-none of these
would have been known to the public but for good journalists
doing their work.
2 67
Dodd also said that when journalists and ordinary citizens fear prosecution
for exposing wrongdoing, it is "more difficult to hold accountable those in
power.,
268
recognized some form of reporter's privilege, including thirty-one states [now thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia] that have adopted shield laws and eighteen that recognize a
common law privilege).
264. Senate Hearing 2006, supra note 143, at 14 (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Former
Solicitor Gen.).
265. Id. at 15. However, Olson also testified that the shield law would not "work a dramatic
expansion of the reporters' privilege or a realignment of public policy . I..." d.
266. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4803 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
267. Id.; see also, House Debate, supra note 175, at 11592 (statement of Rep. Pence)
(expressing concern that under current conditions "there may never be another Deep Throat."); id.
(statement of Rep. Keller) (noting that confidential sources exposed "the cooked books at Enron,
and the unacceptable treatment of soldiers recovering at Walter Reed."); id. at 11593 (statement
of Rep. Conyers) (noting the use of confidential sources to explore fertility clinic fraud, a hospital
scandal involving "patient dumping" by an emergency aid program, and steroid use in Major
League Baseball); id. at 11599 (statement of Rep. Stark) (adding the torture of Iraqi prisoners at
Abu Ghraib to the list of important stories based on confidential sources. Stark said, "If we left it
up to the administration to decide what went into news stories, we would have headlines that told
us the war in Iraq is a smashing success and that Dick Cheney's hunting technique is
unparalleled." Id.).
268. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4803 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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Of course, many members of Congress and witnesses specifically noted
the numbers of journalists in jail or threatened with jail. First Amendment
attorney Abrams testified in the summer of 2005 that 70 journalists had
battled federal prosecutors in the previous year and a half.269 "Some are or
were virtually at the entrance to jail, and Judith Miller, not far from here,
sits in a cell one floor removed from that of Zacarias Moussaoui. It is time
to adopt a federal shield law."
270
Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper, who was subpoenaed by a
special prosecutor in 2005,271 testified that the 'Justice Department
guidelines worked for many years because there was "a civil peace between
prosecutors, who have avoided subpoenaing journalists, and the two camps
have generally stayed out of each other's way., 272 Recently, however, "we
have seen a run of federal subpoenas of journalists ... ," Cooper said.273
He called for a Congress to provide "a clear set of rules. 274
Several people testified that the uncertainty in federal reporter's
privilege law was having a chilling effect on journalists. Attorney Levine,
for example, said that in the wake of recent court decisions ordering
reporters to reveal their sources, the Cleveland Plain Dealer cancelled
publication of two investigative reports based on information from
confidential sources.275 Levine said the Plain Dealer's editor told him that
publishing the stories would have led to a leak investigation "'and the
ultimate choice, talk or go to jail, [and] because talking isn't an option, and
jail is too high a price to pay, these two stories will go untold for now."'
' 276
269. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 18 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Att'y).
270. Id. Zacarias Moussaoui is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for conspiring to kill
Americans as part of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life
Term by Jury over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, § A, at 1.
271. Cooper was subpoenaed in the Valerie Plame case and ordered to testify about who told
him Valerie Plame was a CIA agent. Michael Isikoff, Matt Cooper's Source, NEWSWEEK, July
18, 2005, at 44. He avoided going to jail by agreeing to testify after his source released Cooper
from his promise of confidentiality. Id.
272. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 12 (statement of Matthew Cooper, Reporter,
TIME); see also, Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Geoffrey Stone, Law
Professor) (testifying that for 180 years there was a tradition in this country that prosecutors did
not subpoena journalists even though there was no law prohibiting it. He described the current
situation as "a serious anomaly in our history .... ").
273. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 12 (statement of Matthew Cooper, Reporter,
TIME).
274. Id.
275. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 20 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y; see also,
House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 33 (statement of Lee Levine, Att'y) (offering the same
example of a chilling effect on the media).




Miller of the New York Times countered the arguments of shield law
opponents concerned about the post-9/l1 terrorist threat with this
argument: A shield law is needed to enable reporters to break through the
wall of secrecy that had been built around federal government since the
2001 terrorist attacks.277 She explained:
[D]ramatically increased amounts and types of information are
being classified as secret, and hence, are no longer available for
public review. Last year, more documents were classified
secret and top secret than ever before in American history. In
such a climate, confidential sources, particularly in the national
security and intelligence areas, are indispensable to government
accountability.
278
Government secrecy was more often cited in 2007 as a reason the
nation needed a shield law.279 For example, Rep. William D. Delahunt (D-
Mass.) testified before the House that he supported the shield law as a
response to the "surge of secrecy" in the Bush Administration. 280  He
complained:
So what we have is a growing sense of secrecy or growing
secrecy within the executive branch .... [T]he American
public is being denied information that they have to have to
make informed decisions.
[Secrecy] is the predicate... for the need for this law... ,
and until we address it, we are putting at risk our democracy.28'
Finally, shield law supporters argued that jailing journalists who
refused to comply with subpoenas put the United States in bad company
internationally and exposed the nation to criticism for applying one
standard of freedom to itself and a different standard to other nations.282 As
277. Senate Hearing 2005-B, supra note 21 (statement of Judith Miller, Reporter, NEW
YORK TIMES).
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 81 (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee,
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (referring to "this climate of national security issues
and cloak-and-dagger matters.").
280. Id. at 85 (statement of Rep. Delahunt, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
281. Id. at 86.
282. See, e.g., Introduction, supra note 201, at S4800 (statement of Sen. Lugar) (citing
Reporters Without Borders, 2006 Annual Report, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id
rubrique=573); Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 18 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Att'y.
he introduced shield legislation into the Senate in 2006, Sen. Lugar pointed
out that Reporters Without Borders, an international press freedom
organization, had reported that more than 100 journalists were then in jail
around the world, more than half of them in China, Cuba, and Burma.
283
"This is not good company for the United States of America," Lugar
said.284  "Global public opinion is always on the lookout to advertise
perceived American double standards .... When we support the
development of free and independent press organizations worldwide, it is
important to maintain these ideals at home. 285 Attorney Abrams observed:
[V]irtually every other democratic country outside the United
States, countries without a First Amendment, provide such
protection. The notion that we provide or may provide no
protection in federal courts when countries such as France,
Germany, Austria, provide full protection and countries from
Japan to Argentina and Mozambique to New Zealand provide
such protection using language we would understand as being
First Amendment like in its nature is, it seems to me,
unacceptable.286
George Washington University Law School Professor Randall Eliason
countered in 2007 that arguments comparing the jailing of U.S. journalists
to the treatment of journalists in countries such as China, Burma, or Cuba
"miss the mark., 287 Eliason testified:
In totalitarian societies, journalists are jailed because of the
content of what they write. When journalists are jailed in the
United States, it is because they are refusing to abide by a
lawful court order, entered after a full and fair hearing and due
process of law. Rather than demonstrating that the United
States is akin to a totalitarian regime, these jailings demonstrate
just the opposite; that we are a society governed by the rule of
law, and that no one gets to pick and choose for herself which
laws she will obey.288
283. Introduction, supra note 201, at S4800 (statement of Sen. Lugar) (citing Reporters
Without Borders, 2006 Annual Report, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id-rubrique=573).
284. Id. (statement of Sen. Lugar).
285. Id.
286. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 18 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Att'y.
287. House Hearing 2007, supra note 16, at 58 (statement of Randall D. Eliason, Law
Professor).
288. Id.
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Only Rep. Pence seemed to take the long view when he said he wanted to
look beyond "our times and their controversies and seize the opportunity to
develop clear national standards that will protect the news-gathering
function and promote good government. 289
V. A Messy but Important Job for Congress
Much if not most of the testimony at the Congressional hearings and
debate on the proposed federal shield law focused on issues of social
architecture-that is, on issues of how power should be distributed among
groups in society. The research conducted for this article demonstrates that
the federal shield law debate is above all else a debate about the allocation
of power to the Justice Department and to the media. The debate is about
how much power the Justice Department already has, how much power the
department needs, and whether the courts and the media need a shield law
to check that executive power. Likewise, the debate directly addresses the
question of media power. Do the media have too much power, or do they
need more?
Another finding of this research is that members of Congress and
others who testified at the hearings appeared to disagree about the context
of the power arrangements they were contemplating. To the Justice
Department and other shield law opponents, the post-9/11 terrorist threat
was the most important contextual consideration. The media and other
shield law supporters instead focused primarily on the current uncertainty
in reporter's privilege law, the numbers of journalists incarcerated for
refusing to comply with federal subpoenas, and the resulting chilling effect
on the media.
Deep divisions remain among the interested parties, whose arguments
have changed very little since 2005. The bills before the Congress did
change, however. The bills contained increasing numbers of exceptions as
shield law supporters in Congress attempted to craft legislation that would
satisfy at least some of the law's opponents.
Beyond these findings about the power-distribution arguments in the
shield law hearings and debate, this research suggests two reasons that
shield legislation was not enacted. Shield law legislation died in Congress
because members of Congress and others were bogged down in a fight
about power and because both sides of the debate were operating in a
context of fear. The power issues are contentious, and deciding how to
distribute power proved to be a messy business. Complicated bills with
289. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 10 (statement of Rep. Pence).
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growing lists of exceptions to the testimonial privilege were introduced in
attempts to protect the media without stripping too much power from the
executive branch. Each proposed change raised new concerns, however.
This research also reveals two weaknesses in the social architecture
metaphor as a tool for analyzing and explaining congressional lawmaking.
The social architecture metaphor seems better at describing the result of
lawmaking than the lawmaking process because it fails to convey
adequately the messiness of the task before Congress. The social
architecture metaphor suggests an architect sitting in a quiet office drawing
precise lines. As this research demonstrates, that is not how Congress
worked on the shield law issue. One should, more aptly, think of a county
planning commission negotiating between a developer and a group of
angry residents over plans for a new shopping mall. The image of the
architect working in a quiet office more closely depicts the work of an
appellate court judge, although even that comparison ignores the give and
take among judges.
One should not be surprised that Congressional lawmaking is messy:
Power rarely is ceded graciously. Therefore, the social architecture
metaphor should be expanded to recognize that the process of distributing
power very much differs, depending on whether decisions are made by one
person or by a large group. Failure to recognize that difference
oversimplifies the lawmaking process. Expanding the metaphor to
recognize that difference increases its explanatory power.
The social architecture metaphor also fails to acknowledge the critical
importance of context to the arguments on both sides of the debate. This
research shows that both sides of the federal shield-law debate operated in
the context, or climate, of fear. The Department of Justice, President Bush,
and others who wanted to protect or increase executive branch power were
operating in a post-9/1 1 context; they feared a shield law as a too-
dangerous threat to an already vulnerable nation. Journalists and others
who testified about the current rash of media subpoenas and the chilling
effect created by those subpoenas also operated in a climate of fear. Those
shield law supporters viewed the media as under attack by the federal
government and in need of a strong shield law to save investigative
journalism.
As Rep. Pence told the Senate Judiciary Committee, lawmakers need to
look beyond "our times and their controversies and seize the opportunity to
develop clear national standards that will protect the news-gathering
function and promote good government. ''290 Lawmakers should not allow
290. Senate Hearing 2005-A, supra note 16, at 10 (statement of Rep. Pence).
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their fears to induce them to make bad law. History is replete with
examples of bad lawmaking that resulted from fear. 91
In the future, researchers utilizing the social architecture metaphor
should pay close attention to the perceived context in which power is being
distributed by lawmakers. This research makes it clear that people can
disagree strongly about the context of lawmaking and that their
disagreement can make it extremely difficult to reach consensus. In the
language of social architecture, one reason parties interested in the shield
law could not agree on an architectural plan was that they could not agree
on the shape and slope of the site-the context-on which the structure
was to be built.
The implications of these research findings for the current Congress are
clear and important. A Congressional decision to adopt a federal shield law
would alter the nation's existing social architecture by taking power away
from the Justice Department and giving it to the courts and the media. A
Congressional decision not to adopt a shield law-or to make no decision
at all-affirms the existing social architecture, including our increasingly
powerful executive branch and our weakened media.
How does the Obama presidency affect prospects for a federal shield
law? During his election campaign, Obama promised to support a shield
law.292 If the Justice Department follows Obama's lead and withdraws its
opposition to the legislation, House Speaker Pelosi's prediction might
come true; the current Congress might enact a shield law. The Justice
Department has, after all, been the major shield law opponent.293 However,
the new Congress has the very pressing business of the economic recession
to address, among other issues, so there is no way to predict when Congress
will find the time or have the inclination to consider the shield law again.
Also, while Obama appears less determined than his predecessor to
augment the power of the executive branch, political commentators
291. One famous example is the enactment of the Alien Registration Act, also known as the
Smith Act, by Congress in 1940. The law required all resident aliens to register with the
government and made it a crime to "advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity,
desirability or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States or of any State by
force or violence .... " The Smith Act, ch. 439 §§ 2, 30, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2008)). Legal Historian Geoffrey R. Stone wrote that Congress passed the law
"[a]s even civil libertarians began to rethink the role of civil liberties in an increasingly dangerous
world." GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 251 (W. W. Norton
& Co.) (2004). He said that the "shocking fall of France [to the Germans] ... triggered a sense of
alarm and vulnerability in the United States .... " Id, The law was used to prosecute
Communists until, in the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a number of
convictions under the Smith Act. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
292. David Jackson, McCain, Obama Back Law Shielding Reporters, USA TODAY, April 17,
2008, at 12A.
293. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
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disagree about whether Obama is likely to redirect power from the
executive branch to the other branches of government.294 All this suggests
that it might be some time before Congress revisits shield legislation, but
when Congress does, power issues again will be at the heart of the debate.
When it next considers shield law legislation, Congress should
recognize that the shield law debate is largely about the distribution of
power. Congress should address the power issues directly and explicitly.
The nation deserves a deliberately drawn social architecture, not one made
haphazardly or by accident. Congress should look first to the Framers and
attempt to stay true to the broad outlines of the social architecture drawn by
Madison, Hamilton, and their fellow writers. Although, unfortunately, we
do not know much about what the Framers were thinking when they crafted
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, we do know what they did: The
Framers distributed power among the branches of the federal government
in order to prevent a dangerous concentration of power in any one branch.
Then the Framers guaranteed a powerful press that would help citizens
check the power of the federal government and help keep citizens informed
about what their government was doing. The Framers took a long view and
kept the design simple, which the Congress should do also. The Framers
have given Congress ample guidance for the lawmaking task it faces today.
The nation needs a shield law that prevents an unhealthy concentration
of power in the executive branch of the government-or in any other
branch. And the nation needs a powerful press. That means the nation
needs a strong shield law that will enable journalists to report on the
workings of the federal government and other matters without fear of
facing incarceration or other penalties if they later refuse to reveal the
identities of their confidential sources or to hand over confidential
information or materials. This is a fundamental matter of the proper
distribution of power among government, media, and citizens. Those in the
executive branch who oppose the shield law should trust that a good
government-one drawn as the Framers intended-can protect national
security.
294. See, e.g., James Rosen, Obama Sets Ambitious Bar in Pledge to Rein In Executive
Power, FoxNews.com (Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2008/12/24/
obama-sets-ambitious-bar-pledge-rein-executive-power/ (reporting that "students of the
presidency as well as constitutional law suggest any shift of power between the branches over the
next four years will likely be incremental, not radical."). Id. Rosen quoted one scholar as saying,
"No president lightly gives up all of [his office's] prerogatives." Rosen reported that the same
scholar predicted Obama will "likely try to strike compromises when it comes to the power
dynamic between the president and the rest of Washington." Id.
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